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FAILED LESSONS OF HISTORY:
THE PREDICTABLE SHORTCOMINGS OF THE
PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN ACT
NANCY KUBASEK AND DANIEL TAGLIARINA*

I. INTRODUCTION

President George W. Bush signed the Partial-Birth Abortion
Ban Act (PBABA)l into law1 on November 5, 2005, 2 the culmination
of an eight-year battle led by the National Right to Life Committee
(NRLC), the nation's major right-to-life organization, and
congressional pro-life leaders. The fight for this legislation took
place at a time when similar battles were waged at the state level, with
many laws being pushed through legislatures only to be struck down
as unconstitutional in the courts. This article argues that Congress
passed a Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act that is fatally flawed and
destined to be found unconstitutional because the drafters of the
federal law did not study the judicial treatment of many similar state
laws in drafting their national legislation to avoid the fate of many
state partial-birth abortion statutes.
This article first provides a brief overview of the history of the
regulation of abortion since Roe v. Wade, 4 in order to establish a
context for the subsequent discussion of the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban
Act. Further context is set forth in Part III, which provides a history of
state partial-birth abortion statutes. Part IV describes the history of the
federal Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act, followed by an analysis,
relying primarily on the courts' treatment of state partial-birth statutes,
of why this statute will ultimately be found unconstitutional. The
article concludes with some suggestions as to how those who favor a
ban on partial-birth abortions might consider proceeding in the future.
* B.A., Bowling Green State University, 1980; J.D., University of Toledo College
of Law. Professor Kubasek currently teaches Public Health Law and Environmental Law at
Bowling Green State University. She is the author of seven books and over fifty law review
articles. Daniel Tagliarina, B.A., Bowling Green State University, 2005. Mr. Tagliarina is
currently the Assistant Director of the IMPACT Learning Community at Bowling Green State
University and a Research Assistant for Professor Kubasek.
1. 18 U.S.C.A. § 1531 (2004).
2. 39 WEEKLY CoMP. PREs. Doc. 154 (Nov. 5, 2003).
3. The PBABA was debated by the 104th, 105th, 106th, 107th, and 108th Congresses.
See infra Part TV for a detailed discussion of the passage of this legislation.
4. 410U.S. 113(1973).
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The issue of the legality of the PBABA is significant as the U.S.
Supreme Court is now slated to hear a challenge to the PBABA 5 on
appeal from the Eighth Circuit, 6 with two new Supreme Court justices
who have not yet had the opportunity to rule on an abortion case. The
outcome of this case could reshape the status of abortion rights in the
United States.

11. A BRIEF HISTORY OF ABORTION REGULATION IN THE TWENTIETH
CENTURY

The natural starting point for this history of abortion regulation
is the landmark 1973 case of Roe v. Wade. 7 The ruling issued by the
Court in this case has framed all subsequent legislation related to the
topic. In Roe, the Court, specifically responding to a Texas statute
barring abortions not regarded as necessary to save the life of the
mother, ruled that no state may pass8 laws proscribing all abortions by
declaring their performance a crime.
The constitutional basis for this ruling was derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment and the right to privacy recognized in
Griswold v. Connecticut.9 The decision in Roe recognized that the
right to personal privacy encompasses "only personal rights that can be
deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"'
and therefore bears "some extension to activities related to marriage,
procreation, contraception, family relationships, and child rearing and
education," a realm of concepts that was deemed to include a
prospective mother's right to choose whether to carry a pregnancy to
term. 10

While the Court recognized the validity of a state's interest in
protecting the health of prospective mothers and a potential life and
5. See Supreme Court of the United States Granted & Noted List-Cases to be Argued
October Term 2006 (list of cases slated for argument for the next Supreme Court term),
available at http://www.supremecourtus.gov/orders/06grantednotedlist.html (last visited Apr.
18, 2006).
6. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1314
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (No. 05-380).
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
8. Id. at 163-64.
9. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). The Court reasoned that several of the Bill of Rights
guarantees, including those found in the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth, and Ninth Amendments,
create a "penumbra" of privacy for married couples that is "protected from governmental
intrusion." Id. at 483-85.
10. 410U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973).
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acknowledged a connection between these interests and abortion
legislation, the opinion stated that, because personal privacy is a
"fundamental right," a state could restrict that right of a' ' prospective
mother only when there was a "compelling State interest."
In terms of states' concerns for maternal health, the Court's
judgment, based on the medical knowledge of the time, was that
abortions in the first trimester of pregnancy were no more dangerous
to a woman's health than the act of childbirth itself. Thus, it was
determined that a concern for maternal health justified state
intervention only when the procedure in question was to take place
after this "compelling" point. On the issue of potential life, the Court
elaborated on the constitutional definition of "person." It concluded
that the Constitution, while never defining the term outright, contains3
no definite evidence that the term can be applied prenatally.'
Therefore, the Court decided that constitutional guarantees, such as
those provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, did not extend to the
unborn. 14
Furthermore, the Court did not decide when life genuinely
begins. Instead, the Court acknowledged the role of diverging value
systems and epistemological and metaphysical paradigms in framing
Accordingly, the Court
definitions of "life" and "personhood. ' ,
deferred to the legal concept of viability-the point at which the fetus
is practically capable of survival outside the womb-as the point at
which states are justified in regulating and even proscribing abortions,
except in cases of medical necessity. 16 The lack of a decisive answer
to this question of when life begins and manifold others related to this
issue has served as the impetus for an inundation of legal controversy
11. Id. at 148-56.
12. Id. at 164.
13. Id. at 157-58.
14. Id.
15. Conservative Christians and other pro-life oriented individuals almost always define
life as beginning at fertilization; once a sperm has entered an egg, a new person or "soul" has
been created, and therefore, any termination of this entity is viewed as murder. See Mary
Meehan, Saving Lives through the Churches, HUMAN LIFE REv. 5-32 (2005) (describing the

Biblical basis on which Christians see life beginning at fertilization and therefore consider
abortions against the will of God). However, legal authorities tend to view life as beginning at
later points in the course of pregnancy. See American Bar Association Goes Pro-Choice,
Reproductive Freedom News 14 (1992). The ABA echoed the Court's implied definition of
life beginning at viability, but later rescinded this resolution due to the loss of membership it
caused. See Daniel Oliver, Public Policy H - Deciding Abortion - The Key Questions, Nat'l
Rev., May 9, 2005. Science, while able to declare fetuses alive and dictate the point of fetal
viability, cannot make a determination of when a fetus becomes a "person." Id.
16. Roe, 410 U.S. at 160-65.
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henceforth, as discussed below.
In the parallel case of Doe v. Bolton,17 the Court issued a
closely related opinion. The decision held that state legislation making
it unreasonably burdensome to have an abortion may not be enacted,
because for all practical purposes, such measures would violate the
fundamental right to an abortion established in Roe.1 8 The Court thus
declared null and void state regulations such as mandated pre-approval
for an abortion by a hospital committee, required agreement of two
physicians regarding the decision to abort, and the provision of legal
recourse against locations other than licensed hospitals offering these
procedures. 19
Subsequently, there have been a number of cases brought
before courts of various levels exploring the extent to which abortions
20
can be regulated. Notably, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services
signified a relaxation of federal judicial review of state regulations,
allowing significant freedom for state legislatures to pass measures
restricting abortion practices, assuming such measures were predicted
to withstand an examination of constitutionality. 21 The critical
significance of this decision was its implications for future rulings
such as the decision22 in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.
In Casey, while upholding the constitutional right to an
abortion provided in Roe, a sharply divided Court, by a vote of 5-4,
allowed state legislatures even greater discretion in their regulation of
the procedure. Specifically, in place of the Roe-era requirement of a
"compelling" state interest to justify regulation of abortion, this
decision allowed for the enactment of any law not placing an "undue
burden" on prospective abortion recipients. The term "undue burden"
was defined as a "substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking

17. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 196-99.
20. 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
21. Specifically, the Court refused to invalidate the statute's prohibition against the use
of public funds, employees, and facilities to provide abortions because the prohibition placed
no governmental obstacle in the path of a woman who chose to have an abortion. She was no
worse off than if the state had chosen to provide no public health care, which they are not
bound to provide. The Court found that the statute's prohibition against publicly funded
counseling in favor of abortions was moot because appellees contended that they were not
adversely affected by this provision. Id.
22. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). See Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service
Issue Brief 1B9505, Abortion: Legislative Response 3-4 (2004).

23.

Casey, 505 U.S. 833.
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an abortion of a nonviable fetus."24
Additionally, important in Casey was the shift in the Court's
stance toward the authenticity of states' interests in the protection of
potential life. 25 The Court decided that these interests logically
applied to the entire course of pregnancy, and that state legislation was
appropriate from inception, a ruling going so far as to allow even for
regulations designed to favor carrying the fetus to term.26

III. A HISTORY OF STATE PARTIAL-BRTH ABORTION STATUTES

Since 1995, thirty-one states have passed laws attempting to
ban partial-birth abortions. 27 Eighteen of these statutes have been

24. Id. at 837. The Court reiterated that it was upholding the essential tenets of Roe,
which it saw as having three specific principles:
First is a recognition of the right of the woman to choose to have an
abortion before viability and to obtain it without undue interference from
the State. Before viability, the State's interests are not strong enough to
support a prohibition of abortion or the imposition of a substantial obstacle
to the woman's effective right to elect the procedure. Second is a
confirmation of the State's power to restrict abortions after fetal viability,
if the law contains exceptions for pregnancies which endanger the
woman's life or health. And third is the principle that the State has
legitimate interests from the outset of the pregnancy in protecting the
health of the woman and the life of the fetus that may become a child.
These principles do not contradict one another; and we adhere to each.
Id. at 846.
25. Id. at 878.
26. Id.
27. ALA. CODE § 26-23-1 to 6 (Supp. 1998) (repealed 1999); ALASKA STAT. § 18.16.050
(1997) (repealed 2001); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (1997) (repealed 1997); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-61-202 (1997) (repealed 1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 390.011 (1998) (repealed
1998); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-144 (1997); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-613 (1998); 720 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 513/10 (1998) (repealed 1998); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1 (1997); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 707.8A (1997) (repealed 1999); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (1998); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §
311.720 (1998) (repealed 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (1997) (repealed 1999);
MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17016 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-73 (1997); Mo. REV. STAT.
§ 565.300 (1999) (repealed 2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. §
28-328 (1997) (repealed 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (1997) (repealed 2000); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5A-3 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-02 (1999); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2919.15 (1995) (repealed 1997), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15.1 (2000)
(upheld by the Sixth Circuit in Women's Med. ProfI Corp. v. Taft, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS
25413); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 684 (1998); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12-2 (1997) (repealed
2001); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (1997); S.D. CODIFED LAWS § 34-23A-27 (1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1996); VA. CODE ANN. §

18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999), amended by 18.2-71.1 (2003); W.VA. CODE § 33-42-8
(1998) (repealed 2000); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 895.038 (1998) (repealed 1999).
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challenged in court, 28 and seventeen have been overturned. 29 A careful
examination of the overturned statutes lays the groundwork for the
argument that the PBABA is highly likely to be struck down as
unconstitutional.
Part III.A reviews the four general categories of reasons why
the state statutes were overturned to determine what courts found
problematic or flawed in statutes attempting to ban partial-birth
abortions. Part ILI.B will examine the one state partial-birth abortion
statute that was challenged and upheld, 30 and then examine the thirteen
state statutes that have not been challenged.3 1 Finally, Part III.B will
compare Ohio's 32 and Virginia's 33 revised statutes, which were
rewritten with different degrees of success after being found
unconstitutional.34
A. State Statutes that Failed to Withstand ConstitutionalScrutiny
There appear to be four general categories of reasons why state
statutes attempting to ban partial-birth abortions were overturned. The
28. Summit Med. Assocs. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326 (11th Cir. 1999); Alaska v. Planned
Parenthood, 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001); Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D.
Ariz. 1997); Little Rock Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999); A
Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Midtown Hosp. v.
Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir.
2001); Planned Parenthood v. Miller, 195 F.3d 386 (8th Cir. 1999); Eubanks v. Stengel, 224
F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2000); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999);
Missouri v. Planned Parenthood, 97 S.W.3d 54 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002); Stenberg v. Carhart, 530
U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000); Women's Med.
Prof'l Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997); Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v.
Whitehouse, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2001); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224
F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999); Daniel v. Underwood, 102 F. Supp. 2d 680 (S.D. W.Va. 2000);
Planned Parenthood v. Doyle, 44 F. Supp. 2d 975 (W.D. Wis. 1999).
29. Georgia's partial-birth abortion statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-144 (1997), was the
only state statute to be challenged and found to be constitutional. In addition, Ohio's statute,
which was overturned, was subsequently rewritten, challenged, and upheld. Virginia's statute
was challenged, overturned, and rewritten, but it has not yet been challenged again. See infra
at Part III.B for a discussion of these three statutes and an examination of how these statutes
compare to those that were overturned.
30. GA. CODEANN. § 16-12-144 (1997).
31. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-613 (1998); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1 (1997); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 65-6721 (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17016 (1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-4173 (1997); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-5A-3 (2000); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-02 (1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 684 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-4185 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-27 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1996).
32. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15.1 (2000).
33. VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-71.1 (2003).
34. Women's Med. Prof 1 Corp. v. Voinovich, 130 F.3d 187 (6th Cir. 1997); Richmond
Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999).
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cases falling into these four categories are not all identical, but the
similarities are significant enough to allow grouping. The four general
categories of reasons for overturning the statutes are: (1) vagueness in
the language of the statute; (2) a specific reference to a violation of a
woman's right to privacy due to a consent provision; (3) a more
general violation of a woman's right to privacy by placing an undue
burden on the woman by making it more difficult to obtain safe
abortions; and (4) failing to include an exception to protect the
mother's health or her life. While there are four general categories,
most of the cases cited give several reasons for the unconstitutional
nature of the statutes, and as such, most of these cases fall into
multiple categories.
1. Void for Vagueness
In the first category are state statutes overturned due to the
vagueness of language used in the statute. States whose statutes fall
into the vagueness category are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida,
Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky, Louisiana, New Jersey, Rhode Island, and
Virginia.3 5 By and large, the state statutes falling into this category
have exactly the same or substantially similar wording. The most
common phraseology is: "'Partial-birth abortion' means an abortion in
which the person performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers 36a
living fetus before killing the fetus and completing the delivery."
Ten of the eleven states in the vagueness category share substantially
37
similar wording in their statutes as the wording quoted above.
The state that does not generally conform to the previously
quoted statute is Louisiana, and even its statute possesses the same
basic elements as the other states. Louisiana's statute states:
Partial-birth abortion is the performance of a procedure
on a female by a licensed physician or any other person
whereby a living fetus or infant is partially delivered or
removed from the female's uterus by vaginal means or
35.

ALA. CODE § 26-23-1 to 6 (Supp. 1998) (repealed 1999); ARJZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §

13-3603.01 (1997) (repealed 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-202 (1997) (repealed 1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 390.011 (1998) (repealed 1998); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/10 (1998) (repealed
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8A (1997) (repealed 1999); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.720
(1998) (repealed 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (1997) (repealed 1999); N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (1997) (repealed 2000); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12 (1997) (repealed 2001);
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999), amended by 18.2-71.1 (2003).
36.
37.

ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (1997) (repealed 1997).
These ten states are: Alabama, Arizona, Arkansas, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,

New Jersey, Rhode Island, and Virginia. See supra note 35.
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with specific intent to kill or do great bodily harm and
is then killed prior to complete delivery or removal.38
Despite its effort to avoid vagueness through different wording,
Louisiana's statute is not clearer than the other ten, which share
wording and were all overturned.
A further examination of the statutes overturned for vagueness
exposes the ambiguity in the legislation, and thus why they were found
to be unconstitutional.39 Many of the terms in the common form of the
statute have multiple meanings, and legislatures have made no effort to
rectify the ambiguity in most situations. For example, none of the
statutes make any attempt to clarify which "procedures" are prohibited
and which are acceptable.
Most of the cases addressing the
constitutionality of a vague statute turn on the lack of clarity as to
which abortion procedures are prohibited.
Another common ambiguity is caused by the failure of state
legislatures to define "living fetus" in their statutes. The problematic
nature of this ambiguity is demonstrated in Planned Parenthood42
v.
Woods,41 which challenged the Arizona partial-birth abortion statute.
Judge Bilby explained:

38. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (1997) (repealed 1999).
39. Although numerous different phrases contributed to state partial-birth abortion
statutes being overturned, it should be noted that the term "partial-birth abortion" is also
ambiguous. The term "partial-birth abortion" has no accepted medical meaning, although it
typically refers to the intact dilation and extraction method of abortion, also known as D&X.
Regardless, "partial-birth abortion" is not a medical term used in obstetrics, gynecology, or in
any other medical field, but rather is a term coined by legislators, the media, and anti-abortion
activists. See Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999);
Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997); Eubanks v. Stengel, 224
F.3d 576 (7th Cir. 2000); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999);
Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000). See also A Choice for Women v.
Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (7th
Cir. 2001); Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse, 239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2001).
40. Much of the debate over ambiguities in state partial-birth abortion statutes revolves
around the fact that the definitions of "partial-birth abortion" make it unclear, even to trained
medical professionals, exactly which methods of abortions would be banned under the statute
and which would still be acceptable methods to use. This problem is exacerbated by the fact
that, as stated before, "partial-birth abortion" is not a medical term, see supra note 39, and
thus, use of the term is not sufficient to define any given procedure. Furthermore, the
inclusion of a specific list of which methods are acceptable under the statute was one of the
keys to Ohio's revised partial-birth abortion statute being upheld in court. See OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.15.1 (2000); Women's Med. Prof I Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir.
2003).
41. 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997).
42. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (1997) (repealed 1997).
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Considering other terms utilized in the Act, the Court
notes that the Act does not define "living fetus." Does
"living fetus" under the Act refer to the presence of a
fetal heartbeat? Alternatively, does "living fetus" refer
to living cells? As demonstrated by the testimony in
the case, reasonable physicians differ as to the meaning
43
of what is "living."
As the example from Woods demonstrates, ambiguity in a
statute confuses even experienced physicians. The Court decided that
if physicians cannot tell what is constitutionally protected and
excluded, then the statute must be too vague as written. This example
44
is only one of many of the state statutes facing this same problem.
A third common ambiguity causing the courts to hold statutes
unconstitutional is the phrase "partially vaginally deliver."
The
ambiguous phrase "partially vaginally deliver," more than any other
phrase in partial-birth abortion statutes, calls into question what
exactly is being banned. Numerous cases discuss how the ambiguous
phraseology could be used to ban safe and constitutionally protected
abortion methods.4 5 Although examples abound, one specific example
should clearly demonstrate the unconstitutionally vague nature of the
phrase "partially vaginally deliver." Judge Graham stated:
The phrase "partially vaginally delivers" is subject to
more than one interpretation. The term "delivery" is
given a very broad meaning in obstetrics. Anything
that is removed from the uterus, whether it is a fetus, a
fetal part, or a baby, is considered to be "delivered."
Physicians define the term "living" as having a
heartbeat.
Given the broad definition of the term

43. Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1379 (D. Ariz. 1997).
44. E.g., A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998);
Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001); Eubanks v. Stengel, 224 F.3d 576 (7th Cir.
2000); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999); Planned
Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v.
Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999).
45. Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369, 1379 (D. Ariz. 1997); Little Rock
Family Planning Servs. v. Jegley, 192 F.3d 794 (8th Cir. 1999); A Choice for Women v.
Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (7th
Cir. 2001); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999); Planned
Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000); Rhode Island Med. Soc'y v. Whitehouse,
239 F.3d 104 (1st Cir. 2001); Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th
Cir. 1999).
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"delivery," a physician would consider any procedure a
"partial-birth abortion" if during the course of the
procedure a fetal part is delivered while the remaining
part continues to have a heartbeat.46
What is demonstrated in the excerpt from A Choice for Women
v. Butterworth is that, given the vagueness of the phrase "partially
vaginally deliver," the Florida partial-birth abortion statute is unclear
as to what exactly is being banned. Also, as expressed by Judge
Graham, the vagueness in the language of the statute creates a situation
where the statute becomes overbroad by including
safe, legal abortion
4
procedures in the category of banned procedures. q
2. Violation of the Right to Privacy Due to Consent Provisions
The second category of cases overturning state statutes are
those that explicitly hold that statutorily mandated consent provisions
violate a woman's right to privacy. Four of the seventeen cases that
overturned statutes specifically
mention a woman's right to privacy as
48
a reason for the decision.
Although the four cases cited consent
provisions as one of the reasons why the legislation was
unconstitutional, the consent provisions in each statute were fairly
dissimilar. 49 Because the federal partial-birth abortion statute does not

46. A Choice for Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148, 1157-58 (S.D. Fla.
1998).
47. This point will be explored further in Part II.A.3. See infra Part III.A.3 and
accompanying notes.
48. State of Alaska v. Planned Parenthood, 35 P.3d 30 (Alaska 2001); Planned
Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603
(7th Cir. 2001); Causeway Med. Suite v. Foster, 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999).
49. Alaska, Arizona, Illinois, and Louisiana all included consent provisions in their
respective partial-birth abortion statutes. Alaska's consent provision required minors seeking
partial-birth abortions to obtain parental consent. In State of Alaska v. Planned Parenthood,
35 P.3d 30, 33 (Alaska 2001), Judge Bryner stated, "privacy is a fundamental individual right,
...this right encompasses a pregnant woman's reproductive choices, and ... it applies to
minors and adults co-extensively, regardless of age." Arizona's partial-birth abortion statute
goes a step further than Alaska's by requiring consent from the parents of a child under
eighteen, as well as from the spouse of a woman who is over eighteen. See Planned
Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997). Similar to Alaska, Illinois's partialbirth abortion statute, 720 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 513/10 (1998) (repealed 1998), requires parental
consent in all cases where a minor seeks a partial-birth abortion. Louisiana's partial-birth
abortion statute, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (1997) (repealed 1999), goes the farthest with
the consent provision. Under the Louisiana statute, a physician must obtain parental consent
for minors and spousal consent for women over eighteen. Additionally, the Louisiana statute
subjects the physician to litigation from the putative father and a maternal "grandparent,"
unless the pregnancy was criminally caused.
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have a consent provision, this article will not discuss this particular
defect.
3. Violation of the Right to Privacy by Placingan Undue
Burden on the Exercise of the Right
The third category of cases overturning state partial-birth
abortion statutes decided that the statutes violated a woman's right to
privacy by placing an undue burden on her exercise of that right.
However, unlike statutes with consent provisions, the violation of
privacy here is more general and refers to statutes that impinge the
right by making it more difficult for women to obtain safe abortions
prior to or post-viability, thus placing an undue burden on them. The
"undue burden" category is the largest grouping of cases, containing
cases from sixteen different states.5 °
The rulings in this category hold that the statute, as a whole, is
ambiguous to such a degree that it appears to prevent women from
seeking constitutionally protected forms of abortions. 5 1 Furthermore,
these statutes also tend to be unreasonably constrictive because their
50. ALA. CODE § 26-23-1 to 6 (Supp. 1998) (repealed 1999); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-3603.01 (1997) (repealed 1997); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-202 (1997) (repealed 1999); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 390.011 (1998) (repealed 1998); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 513/10 (1998) (repealed
1998); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.8A (1997) (repealed 1999); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.720
(1998) (repealed 2000); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (1997) (repealed 1999); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.17016 (1997); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-328 (1997) (repealed 2000); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2A:65A-6 (1997) (repealed 2000); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (1995) (repealed 1997),
amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15.1 (2000) (upheld by the Sixth Circuit in
Women's Medical Profil Corp. v. Taft, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25413); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 234.12 (1997) (repealed 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999), amended by
18.2-71.1 (2003); W.VA. CODE § 33-42-8 (1998) (repealed 2000); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.038
(1998) (repealed 1999).
51. See Planned Parenthood v. Woods, 982 F. Supp. 1369 (D. Ariz. 1997); A Choice for
Women v. Butterworth, 54 F. Supp. 2d 1148 (S.D. Fla. 1998); Midtown Hosp. v. Miller 36 F.
Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 1998); Hope Clinic v. Ryan, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001); Stenberg
v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000); Planned Parenthood v. Farmer, 220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000).
There are seven commonly used methods of partial-birth abortion: suction curettage, suction
aspiration, dilation and evacuation (D&E), dilation and extraction (D&X), labor induction,
hysterotomy, and hysterectomy. The cited cases go into detail as to the specifics of each
procedure. The partial-birth abortion statutes that were overturned due to an undue burden
were overturned because the statute precluded the use of the D&X procedure as well as the
protected D&E procedure, and in some cases, the suction curettage procedure. The word
"protected" is used to distinguish the D&E from the D&X procedure. The D&X procedure is
the one typically thought to be at issue in "partial-birth abortions," although most pieces of
legislation do not clearly identify the D&X procedure as being the one banned. The D&E
procedure is used in early abortions, as well as some later ones, and is not considered a partialbirth abortion as the fetus is not removed whole (as with the D&X procedure). Therefore, the
word "protected" refers to the fact that the D&E procedure has been found to be constitutional
under past cases, but due to ambiguous wording was lumped into procedures that would be
banned by the various state statutes that had been overturned.
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wording appears to prevent women from obtaining what would be the
safest form of abortion, while still allowing other procedures, which
involve greater health or safety risks. The undue burden is the limiting
of the procedures women can actively seek, especially when the
procedure is constitutionally protected, or when the procedure is the
safest a woman could receive in a given situation.
5 2 the Third
For example, in Planned Parenthood v. Farmer,
Circuit addressed the issue of over-inclusiveness in New Jersey's
partial-birth abortion statute as it pertains to prohibiting safe and
constitutionally protected abortion procedures. In Farmer, Judge
Barry stated, "The Act erects a substantial obstacle because ...it is so

vague as to be easily construed to ban even the safest, most common
and readily available conventional pre- and post-viability abortion
procedures."5 3 The court overturned the state statute because it
included constitutionally protected methods of abortion, as well as
Another, more
those methods that are the safest to perform.
basic
point
is
given
in
Hope Clinic v.
illustrative example of the same
54
Ryan, where Judge Kocoras elucidated:
For two reasons, the court finds that [the statute]
imposes an undue burden on a woman's constitutional
right to choose to terminate her pregnancy before
viability. First, the statute, as written, has the potential
effect of banning the most common and safest abortion
procedures. It does so without regard for the viability
of the fetus. Second, the statute does not permit a
physician to use the prohibited procedure when it is
necessary to protect the woman's health, whether
mental or physical, or when an alternative abortion
procedure would compromise the woman's health. As
such, [the statute] is clearly unconstitutional.55
Similar to Farmer, the Illinois partial-birth abortion statute was
overturned because it, too, included safe and constitutional procedures
within the scope of the ban enacted by the statute. Furthermore, the
statute also prevented the use of the prohibited method when it would
be the safest possible method to use, effectively leaving out a health
52.
53.
54.
55.

220 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 2000).
Id. at 144.
995 F. Supp. 847 (N.D. Ill. 1998), affd, 249 F.3d 603 (7th Cir. 2001).
Id. at 857.
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exception, which is the fourth category of reasons why state statutes
were overturned.
4. Failure to Include an Exception to Protectthe Life or
Health of the Mother
The final category of overturned state partial-birth abortion
statutes is statutes with no exception to protect the mother's health and
or life. This category also includes cases where the health or life
exception, although present in the statute, was found inadequate.
Twelve state statutes were overturned, in part, because of the lack of a
56
overturned
health exception, while four additional state statutes
57 were
because the life exception was deemed inadequate.
The reasons underlying the repeal of the twelve state statutes
that failed to include a health exception for the mother are fairly
straightforward. Simply put, the statutes were overturned because
there is no exception for when the partial-birth abortion is necessary to
protect the mother's health, but not necessarily her life. In fact, this
behind the
rationale, although not the only one, was a major factor
58
Court's intervention in the case of Stenberg v. Carhart.
In the majority opinion in Stenberg, Justice Breyer explained
that the requirement for the health exception was established in
Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,59 which
reiterated points made in Roe v. Wade.6 ° Justice Breyer wrote:
The Casey plurality opinion reiterated what the Court
held in Roe; that subsequent to viability, the State in
promoting its interest in the potentiality of human life
may, if it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe,
abortion except where it is necessary, in appropriate
56. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3603.01 (1997) (repealed 1997); FLA. STAT. ANN. §
390.011 (1998) (repealed 1998); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (1997) (repealed 1999); Mo.
REV. STAT. § 565.300 (1999) (repealed 2002); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-328 (1997) (repealed
2000); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:65A-6 (1997) (repealed 2000); Omfo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15
(1995) (repealed 1997), amended by OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15.1 (2000) (upheld by the
Sixth Circuit in Women's Medical Prof1 Corp. v. Taft, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25413); R.I.
GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12 (1997) (repealed 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed
1999), amended by 18.2-71.1 (2003); W.VA. CODE ANN. § 33-42-8 (1998) (repealed 2000);
WIS. STAT. ANN. § 895.038 (1998) (repealed 1999).
57. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-202 (1997) (repealed 1999); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9
(1997) (repealed 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12 (1997) (repealed 2001); VA. CODE ANN. §
18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999), amended by 18.2-71.1 (2003).
58. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
59. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
60. 410U.S. 113 (1973).
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medical judgment, for
the preservation of the life or
61
health of the mother.
Breyer pointed out that two previous Supreme Court rulings mandated
a health exception for statutes attempting to limit abortions. 62 In
Stenberg, Nebraska argued that the health exception established in
Roe 63 and Casey64 was not necessary because other safe methods of
abortions existed besides the post-mortality dilation and extraction
(D&X) procedure, which the state equated with the term "partial-birth
abortion." In addressing Nebraska's argument, Justice Breyer stated:
Where a significant body of medical opinion believes a
procedure may bring with it greater safety for some
patients and explains the medical reasons supporting
that view, we cannot say that the presence of a different
view by itself proves the contrary.
Rather, the
uncertainty means a significant likelihood that those
who believe that D&X is a safer abortion method in
certain circumstances may turn out to be right. If so,
then the absence of a health exception will place
women at an unnecessary risk of tragic health
consequences. If they are wrong, the exception
will
65
unnecessary.
been
have
simply turn out to
In the end, the Court held that the controversy over whether the
D&X procedure is in fact the safest method is beyond the scope of the
Court's review, as long as doctors have determined that in some
circumstances it is the safest procedure. 6 6 The Court held that it is
unlawful to prevent what could be the safest abortion method under
certain circumstances because subjecting women to other procedures
in these instances might jeopardize their health and thereby violate the
protections set forth in Roe 6 7 and Casey.68 The Stenberg opinion

61. 530 U.S. at 930 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 879 (quoting Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65))
(emphasis added by J. Breyer) (quotations omitted).
62. See id.
63. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
64. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
65. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 937 (2000).
66. Id.
67. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
68. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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provided the basis for overturning many of the other eleven statutes in
this category.
In some statutes, although a life exception is present, the Court
has deemed it inadequate. Similar to the health exception cases, this
rationale is fairly straightforward. An adequate life exception is
necessary to allow a woman to obtain an abortion if the pregnancy
threatens her life, or if the abortion procedure itself is dangerous and a
different method is needed to protect the mother's life. A clear
example of this logic is seen in Causeway Medical Suite v. Foster,69 a
Louisiana case challenging the state partial-birth abortion statute.
Similar to the cases discussed supra involving a failure to include a
health exception, the Louisiana statute lacked a health exception and
also contained an inadequate life exception. In discussing the life
exception, Judge Porteous explained:
Additionally, while the Act does provide an exception
for the life of the mother, this exception is wholly
inadequate. The life exception only permits the use of
life saving banned abortion procedures when they
"[are] necessary to save the life of a mother [whose] life
is endangered by a physical disorder, physical illness or
physical injury; and [furthermore only if] no other
medical procedure would suffice for that purpose." In
effect, this provision may force a woman to choose
higher risk procedures in her attempt to preserve her
own life.

. .

.

For example, if a hysterotomy or

hysterectomy would suffice to save a woman's life, the
physician must resort to these procedures even though
they present far greater risks to the woman's health and
may leave her infertile.7 °
Judge Porteous provided a clear example of what it means to
have an inadequate life exception, thus falling short of actually
protecting the mother's life. The three other statutes that fall into this
category' were overturned for similar reasons as those cited in
Causeway.
69. 43 F. Supp. 2d 604 (E.D. La. 1999).
70. Id. at 614 (quoting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:32.9 (B) (emphasis added by the
court)).
71. ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-61-202 (1997) (repealed 1999); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 23-4.12
(1997) (repealed 2001); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999), amended by 18.271.1 (2003).
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B. State Statutes that Have Withstood ConstitutionalScrutiny, Have
Not Been Challenged,or Have Been Challenged and Revised
While most challenged state statutes have failed to withstand
constitutional scrutiny, only one statute was found to be valid.72
Meanwhile, other statutes have not been challenged at all.73 Finally,
there are two state statutes that have been challenged, overturned, and
subsequently revised.74 Part III.B focuses on those statutes and
evaluates the changes these two states made in order to pass
constitutional muster.
Georgia was the only state to have its original partial-birth
abortion statute challenged and upheld as constitutional.75 The statute
was found to be valid because of specifics unique to the Georgia case,
Midtown Hospital v. Miller.76 To understand Midtown Hospital, one
must understand a previous challenge 77 raised by the plaintiffs in 1997
seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent the enforcement of
the Georgia partial-birth abortion statute. In the 1997 Midtown
Hospital case, the plaintiffs sought a restraining order to prevent the
enforcement of the statute while the other cases (i.e., those that
actually challenged the statute) were still pending. The court held that
the plaintiffs provided no evidence of a "threat of immediate
irreparable injury and.., it is unlikely that the Plaintiffs will prevail
on the merits."
Notably, while the court denied the plaintiffs'
request for a restraining order and stated that the plaintiffs were
unlikely to succeed on the merits of the case, this case did not directly
uphold the statute.
Midtown Hospital79 is unique because the court took certain
liberties that none of the other courts have taken. Although the court
upheld the law, it defined the statute in a way that is comparable to the

72. GA. CODE ANN. § 16-12-144 (1997).
73. See supra note 31.
74. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (1995) (repealed 1997), amended by OHIO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.15.1 (2000) (upheld by the Sixth Circuit in Women's Medical Prof1 Corp.
v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003)); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999),
amended by VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1 (2003) (Virginia's statute was rewritten, but the
revised statute has not yet been challenged).
75. As noted above, Ohio's statute was initially challenged and struck down, but it was
then revised and the revision upheld. See infra notes 106-123 and accompanying text for a
thorough discussion of the Ohio statute.
76. Reported at 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360, 1367 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
77. Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
78. Id. at 1367.
79. Id.
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findings of the courts that overturned the statutes. This point 8becomes
0
clearer when examining the specifics from Midtown Hospital.
81
Plaintiffs first argued that the statute was void for vagueness.
The plaintiffs claimed that "partial-birth abortion" had no fixed
medical meaning, so it was unclear which procedures were being
prohibited. Furthermore, the plaintiffs claimed that the term "living
fetus" was ambiguous and could potentially include constitutionally
protected forms of abortion. Instead of agreeing with the plaintiffs,
which is what most of the other courts did when presented with similar
arguments, the Georgia court instead took it upon itself to clear up the
ambiguity in the law, thus allowing the statute to stand.
One example of the court's clarification comes with respect to
the term "living." Judge Forrester stated:
The Georgia General Assembly chose to define partialbirth abortions in terms of a "living" fetus. In the
context of the jurisprudence in this area, such a phrase
can only mean "viable." As a result, the court cannot
find a lack of notice as to whether the statute applies to
post-viability abortions. . . . Moreover, the statute is
not void for lack of further definition about when a
fetus becomes living or viable. That point in the
development of a fetus was thought to be of sufficient
precision 82by the Supreme Court in PlannedParenthood
v. Casey.
Judge Forrester defined "living" to mean "viable," thus
limiting the scope of the statute to post-viability abortions. While
many of the other courts found the other state statutes to be
unconstitutionally vague, the Georgia court clarified the law, but did
not overturn it. Accordingly, the official actions of the Georgia court
differ from those taken by other courts that heard similar challenges to
partial-birth abortion statutes. Yet the final implications of the court's
actions were similar in so far as ambiguities were explicated.
The plaintiffs also challenged the statute on the grounds that it
violated the substantive due process rights of women. 83 In addressing
the substantive due process claim, the court first identified seven
80.

Id.

81. Id. at 1363.
82. Id.
83. 36 F. Supp. 2d at 1361.
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abortion procedures that were currently available: hysterotomy,
hysterectomy, induction methods, post-mortality dilation and
evacuation (D&E), post-mortality dilation and extraction (D&X), and
D&E and D&X performed without first terminating the fetus's life.84
The court found that the statute prevented only two of these seven
procedures. Judge Forrester explained that "physicians can continue to
employ D&E and D&X techniques in appropriate cases after they first
cause the demise of the fetus. 85 Consequently, the court found that
only two of the seven available procedures were barred from use by
the state statute. Furthermore, of the five procedures still allowed, two
of them were variations of the two that were prohibited. Unlike the
two invalid procedures, the two permissible procedures required fetal
demise before using the D&E or D&X technique. The court found
that because these five other techniques were not restricted, including
the two variations of the two that were restricted, there was no
violation of due process, ergo the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed
on the merits.
One final point should be made about the Georgia statute.
Unlike some of the statutes examined earlier, the Georgia statute
contained both a health and a life exception, allowing for abortions
post-viability to protect the health or life of the mother. 86 By having
these two exceptions, it appears that the Georgia statute avoided the
pitfalls that the previously discussed state statutes fell into.
In the subsequent 1998 Midtown Medical Hospital case, 87 the
court approved stipulations that were agreed upon by the plaintiffs and
the defendants. The stipulations included the definition of "living
fetus" as "viable," the prohibition of the D&E and D&X procedures
where the fetus is not first terminated before the procedure, and the
reiteration of the health and life exceptions. 88 Consequently, the 1998
case served to formalize the clarifications made by the court in the
1997 case. As such, the Georgia partial-birth abortion statute was not
overturned, but rather interpreted in such a way as to make the end
results similar to those reached in the cases that did overturn state
statutes. Essentially, there is little or no difference between the
Georgia statute and the seventeen statutes that were overturned.

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Id. at 1362.
Id. at 1363.
Id. at 1365.
Midtown Hosp. v. Miller, 36 F. Supp. 2d 1360 (N.D. Ga. 1998).
Id. at 1368.
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As stated previously, thirteen state partial-birth abortion
statutes 89 have not been challenged. The statutes may not have been
challenged because they have something the other statutes lacked or
because they fall victim to the same weaknesses, but simply have not
been challenged in court yet. Instead of examining each individual
statute in-depth, the following focuses on the definitions in the statutes
and whether the statutes include health and life exceptions.
The first group of statutes that have not been challenged are
those with substantially similar wording to the majority of statutes that
have been overturned. State statutes falling into this category of laws
that probably would be overturned if challenged, due to vague
wording, are: Idaho, Indiana, Michigan, Mississippi, Oklahoma, South
Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee. 9° The implication of these
definitions and the previously examined cases is that, if these eight
state statutes were to be challenged, they more than likely would be
overturned for the previously examined reasons of vagueness and
imposing an undue burden on a woman's right to an abortion.
For example, the definition used in the Idaho partial-birth
abortion statute is similar to the other seven in this category and is also
similar to the definition presented in the section of state statutes that
were determined to be void for vagueness. The Idaho statute states:
"'Partial-birth abortion' means an abortion in which the person
performing the abortion partially vaginally delivers a living fetus
before killing the fetus and completing the delivery." 91 Again, the
ambiguous phraseology, "partially vaginally delivers," appears. Based
on the prior discussions of this phraseology,9 2 the Idaho statute and the
other seven that have not been challenged but are practically carbon
copies of this definition, would all be found unconstitutional. Because
the statutes would be overturned, it appears that they have not been
contested, not because of an inherent quality they share, but rather for
some other reason, perhaps simply because no one has challenged
these laws yet.
The second group of statutes consists of those whose
definitions have attempted to clear up the ambiguity that has caused
other statutes to be overturned for vagueness. The states that used
89. See supra note 31.
90. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-613 (1998); IND. CODE § 16-34-2-1 (1997); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.17016 (1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-73 (1997); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 684
(1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-27 (1997); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997).
91. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-613 (1998).

92. See supra Part III.A.1.
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more specific wording are: Kansas, Montana, New Mexico, North
Dakota, and Utah.9 3 While the specific wording of these five state
statutes varies, they share common concepts. All five state statutes
attempt to limit the scope of the statute to the intact dilation and
extraction (D&X) procedure. 94 These states accomplish this limiting
process by specifically listing the steps of the procedure that are
considered a partial-birth abortion, so that there is no ambiguity over
which procedure is being restricted. 95 However, Utah's statute is ' the
96
only one to specifically include the phrase "dilation and extraction.
Moreover, Kansas, North Dakota, and Utah 97 go as far as to list
protected forms of abortions that are excluded from the partial-birth
abortion ban. While these three states do not list the same procedures,
all three make an effort to clear up which abortion procedures are
protected from prosecution. The inclusion of protected methods
attempts to clarify the problem examined previously in which state
statutes were determined to be over-inclusive and effectively barred
protected forms of abortion procedures. For example, the Utah statute
states:
"Partial-birth abortion" or "dilation and extraction
procedure" means the termination of pregnancy by
partially vaginally delivering a living intact fetus,
purposefully inserting an instrument into the skull of
the intact fetus, and utilizing a suction device to remove
the skull contents. This definition does not include the
dilation
and
evacuation
procedure
involving
dismemberment prior to removal, the suction curettage
procedure,98 or the suction aspiration procedure for
abortion.

Clearly the effort to be more specific has helped Utah avoid the
significant ambiguities contained in the more generic definition that is
commonly used. Given the precedents set by the various courts

93. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (1998); MONT.CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5A-3 (2000); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-02 (1999); UTAH CODE ANN. § 767-310.5 (1996).
94. See, e.g., id.

95. See, e.g., id.
96. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1996).

97. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (1998); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-02 (1999); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1996).
98. UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1996).
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hearing challenges to partial-birth abortion statutes, the Kansas,
Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah statutes, which clarify
significant ambiguities, would probably be upheld in court. Therefore,
the apparent constitutionality could explain why these statutes have
not been challenged.
The third group of cases switches focuses, and instead
examines the presence of life and health exceptions for the mother.
This third group includes those state statutes that have a life exception
for the mother, but are lacking the requisite health exception.
Unchallenged state statutes that do not have a health exception
include: Idaho, Michigan, Mississippi, North Dakota, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, South Dakota, and Tennessee.99 While these eight
states have life exceptions, the statutes do not include an exception to
protect the mother's health. As was presented in Roe, 00 Casey,10 1 and
again in Stenberg, 102 a health exception is necessary for a statute to be
constitutional. Therefore, the eight statutes in this category would be
found unconstitutional if challenged because they fail to provide for
the protection of the mother's health.
In sum, although these thirteen state statutes have not been
challenged, nine10 3 of them would be overturned based on the four
criteria examined in Part I.A. 104 The four statutes that would be
are the statutes from
upheld based upon the precedents examined
05
Kansas, Montana, New Mexico, and Utah. 1
Finally, the two statutes that were challenged, overturned, and
revised, are the statutes from Ohio and Virginia. 1°6 The revised Ohio
99. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-613 (1998); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 333.17016 (1997); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 41-41-73 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-02 (1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, §
684 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (1997); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-27 (1997);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997).

100. 410U.S. 113(1973).
101. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
102. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
103. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 18-613 (1998); IND.

CODE § 16-34-2-1 (1997); MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 333.17016 (1997); MISS. CODE ANN. § 41-41-73 (1997); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-02.6-

02 (1999); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 684 (1998); S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-41-85 (1997); S.D.
CODIFIED LAWS § 34-23A-27 (1997); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-15-209 (1997).

104. The four criteria identified earlier are: (1) vagueness in the language of the statute,
(2) a specific reference to a violation of a woman's right to privacy due to a consent provision,
(3) a more general violation of a woman's right to privacy by placing an undue burden on the
woman by making it more difficult to obtain safe abortions prior to or post-viability, and (4)
failing to include an exception to protect the mother's health or her life.
105. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-6721 (1998); MONT. CODE ANN. § 50-20-401 (1997); N.M.
STAT. ANN. § 30-5A-3 (2000); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-310.5 (1996).
106. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 (1995) (repealed 1997), amended by OHiO REV.
CODE ANN. § 2919.15.1 (2000) (upheld by the Sixth Circuit in Women's Medical Prof I Corp.
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statute has two sections, one accounting for pre-viability, 10 7 and the
other accounting for post-viability, both of which use essentially the
same language. 10 8 The Ohio statute criminalizing partial-birth
abortions states:
When the fetus that is the subject of the procedure is
viable, no person shall knowingly perform a partialbirth procedure on a pregnant woman when the
procedure is not necessary, in reasonable medical
judgment, to preserve the life or health of the mother as
a result of the mother's life or health being endangered
by a serious risk of the substantial and irreversible
impairment of a major bodily function.I°9
The Ohio statute also defines partial-birth abortion as:
"Partial-birth procedure" means the medical procedure
that includes all of the following elements in sequence:
(a) Intentional dilation of the cervix of a pregnant
woman, usually over a sequence of days; (b) In a
breech presentation, intentional extraction of at least the
lower torso to the navel, but not the entire body, of an
intact fetus from the body of the mother, or in a
cephalic presentation, intentional extraction of at least
the complete head, but not the entire body, of an intact
fetus from the body of the mother; (c) Intentional
partial evacuation of the intracranial contents of the
fetus, which procedure the person performing the
procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus,
intentional compression of the head of the fetus, which
procedure the person performing the procedure knows
will cause the death of the fetus, or performance of
another intentional act that the person performing the
procedure knows will cause the death of the fetus;
(d)
110
Completion of the vaginal delivery of the fetus.
v. Taft, 2003 U.S. App. LEXIS 25413); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999),
amended by 18.2-71.1 (2003) (Virginia's statute was rewritten, but the revised statute has not
yet been challenged).
107. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(B) (2000).
108. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(C) (2000).
109. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(B), (C) (2000).
110. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(A)(3) (a)-(d) (2000).
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It is immediately obvious that both the criminalizing statute
and the definition of partial-birth abortion differ significantly from
those in statutes that were overturned due to vagueness. Also, it
should be noted that the statute clearly has health and life exceptions
protecting the mother.
In Women's Medical ProfessionalCorp. v. Voinovich,"I which
overturned the original Ohio partial-birth abortion statute, the court
found two main flaws in the Ohio partial-birth abortion statute. By
examining the two flaws, we can compare what is different now that
the statute has been revised, and see why the statute is constitutional in
its revised form.
The first reason the initial Ohio statute was overturned was
because it lacked a health exception. The court ruled that the statute
was unconstitutional because it did not allow a post-viability abortion
"where necessary to prevent a serious non-temporary threat to a
pregnant woman's mental health." ' 1 2 As explained earlier, both
Casey 113 and Stenberg 14 ruled that a health exception is necessary for
a statute limiting abortions to be constitutional. Ohio's revised statute,
however, has corrected its original version, and it now contains a
health exception. Regardless, the plaintiffs in Women's Medical
ProfessionalCorp. v. Taft' 15 challenged the revised statute, in part, on
the grounds that its health exception was inadequate.
When the revised Ohio statute116 was challenged,' 7 the court
found the health exception to be adequate. In the opinion, Judge Ryan
stated: "In our view, this [health] exception allows physicians to
perform the partial-birth procedure whenever the procedure is
necessary to protect the mother from significant health risks, including
those which embody comparative safety concerns."' 1 8 According to
the court, the new health exception in the revised Ohio statute allows
partial-birth abortions when necessary to protect the health of the
mother and when the partial-birth abortion procedure is safer in a

111.
112.
113.
114.
115.

130 F.3d 187 (6thCir. 1997).
Id. at 209.
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
530 U.S. 914 (2000).
353 F.3d 436, 438 (6th Cir. 2003).

116.
117.
118.

OHIo REv. CODEANN. § 2919.151 (2000).
Women's Medical Prof 1Corp. v. Taft, 353 F.3d 436 (6th Cir. 2003).
Id. at 449.
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given situation than a different abortion procedure. 119 However, Judge
Ryan did put a caveat on the health exception when he stated:
[T]he exception does not apply when the choice of
methods is dictated purely by the preference of an
individual physician. But when a woman's actual
medical condition makes the partial-birth procedure
necessary to prevent a significant health risk, the health
exception applies. Likewise, the exception is triggered
when other procedures, relative to the partial-birth
procedure, would expose a woman to significant
120
risks.
Consequently, the health exception allows partial-birth
abortions when they are the safest procedure in light of existing health
concerns, but not when it is the mere preference of the practicing
physician. Ultimately, the court found the health exception to be
adequate and upheld the Ohio partial-birth abortion statute.
The second reason the original Ohio statute was overturned
was because it placed an undue burden on a woman's right to obtain
an abortion when the definition of partial-birth abortion in the statute
included the most widely used D&E procedure. 12 1 Although the
legislature tried to restrict the use of only the D&X procedure, the
wording was vague and would have included the D&E procedure.
However, the revised version of the statute takes two specific actions
to avoid a repeat of this problem.
First, the revised statute specifically lists the steps involved in
the banned procedure, 122 clearly defining the D&X procedure. The
specific definition is similar to the one seen in the unchallenged
statutes from Kansas, Montana, New Mexico, North Dakota, and Utah.
By specifically listing the steps of the banned procedure, the Ohio
legislature left no doubt as to which procedure was being banned. The
second action taken by the Ohio legislature to avoid having the revised
statute declared unconstitutional was to specifically list protected
forms of abortions: suction curettage, suction aspiration, and the
dilation and evacuation (D&E) procedures. 123 By doing so, the revised

119. Id.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id.
OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(A)(3) (a)-(d) (2000).

Id.
OHIOREV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(F) (2000).
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statute did not create an undue burden because it specifically protected
the D&E procedure and, thus, was not overbroad.
By specifically addressing the two areas that caused the
original partial-birth abortion statute to be overturned, Ohio's
legislature was able to revise the statute, making it constitutional.
Given that the new statute was challenged and upheld, it offers some
guidance as to what is required in a partial-birth abortion statute to
avoid imposing an undue burden and to present an adequate health
exception.
An example of a statute that was revised and then struck down
124
a second time is Virginia's revised partial-birth abortion statute.
Virginia's original partial-birth abortion statute was overturned in
1999125 and was then revised in 2003.126 The revised statute was
struck down in 2004.127 The court held the statute facially invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment for a number of independent
reasons, namely:
(1) [I]t lacks an exception to protect a woman's health,
(2) it places an undue burden on a woman's right to
decide to have an abortion, (3) its life exception is
inadequate, (4) it bans-in the absence of a compelling
state interest-other safe gynecological procedures
such as those used in certain miscarriage presentations,
and (5) it is unconstitutionally vague.
The Fourth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment on this basis,
stating that the judgment of the district court must be upheld because
of the Court's unequivocal holding in Stenberg v. Carhart that "any
ban on partial-birth abortion must include an
exception for the health
129
constitutional."'
be
to
order
in
of the mother
The original Virginia statute had been struck down on three
grounds: it failed to provide an exception for the mother's health, it
was unconstitutionally vague, and it placed an undue burden on the
woman. 130 Because the legislature failed to pay close attention to
124. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999), amended by 18.2-71.1 (2003).
125. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999).
126. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999), amended by 18.2-71.1 (2003).
127. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 301 F. Supp. 2d 499 (2004).
128. Id. at 513-17.
129. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005) (quoting
Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 219 F.3d 376, 377 (4th Cir. 2000)).
130. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Gilmore, 224 F.3d 337 (4th Cir. 1999).
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these three problems when it revised the statute, the revised statute
likewise failed to meet constitutional muster, even though the revised
version did appear to be an improvement over the original.
A key reason for overturning the original Virginia statute was
the absence of an exception to protect the mother's health. 3 ' The
relevant section of the revised statute states:
This section shall not prohibit the use by a physician of
any procedure that, in reasonable medical judgment, is
necessary to prevent the death of the mother, so long as
the physician takes every medically reasonable step,
consistent with such procedure, to preserve the life and
health of the infant. A procedure shall not be deemed
necessary to prevent the death of the mother if
completing the delivery of the
living infant would
132
prevent the death of the mother.
While the revised statute obviously contains an exception for
the mother's life, the statute appears to be lacking an exception to
protect the mother's health. Nowhere is the word "health" used with
respect to the mother, even though it references the health of the
infant. The exclusion of a health exception is peculiar given that the
original statute was overturned, in part, because the statute lacked a
health exception. Given the mandates of Casey133 and Stenberg,134 one
would have expected the legislature to have added an exception to
protect the mother's health. Its failure to do so was indeed a fatal flaw
in the revised statute.
Because the Fourth Circuit had declared the statute facially35
unconstitutional, the court did not analyze the rest of the statute.'
However, one member of the court disagreed. 36 Part of his dissent
highlights some of the things that the legislature did "right" in its
revision and hence, may provide guidance for other legislators in the
future. As noted in Judge Niemeyer's dissent, the legislature's effort
to address these issues in the revision was successful. For example,
the revised statute defining "partial-birth infanticide" states:
131. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005).
132. VA. CODEANN. §18.2-71.1(E) (2003).
133. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
134. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
135. See, e.g., Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005).
136. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619 (4th Cir. 2005) (Niemeyer,
J., dissenting).
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For the purposes of this section, "partial-birth
infanticide" means any deliberate act that (i) is intended
to kill a human infant who has been born alive, but who
has not been completely extracted or expelled from its
mother, and that (ii) does kill such infant, regardless of
whether death occurs before or after extraction or
expulsion from its mother has been completed.
The term "partial-birth infanticide" shall not under any
circumstances be construed to include any of the
following procedures: (i) the suction curettage abortion
procedure, (ii) the suction aspiration abortion
procedure, (iii) the dilation and evacuation abortion
procedure involving dismemberment of the fetus prior
to removal from the body of the mother, or (iv)
completing delivery of a living human infant and
severing the umbilical 37cord of any infant who has been
completely delivered.1
Clearly the Virginia legislature attempted to make the
definition more specific and to avoid the ambiguities present in their
former definition.1 38 Additionally, the statute defines "human infant
who has been born alive,'' 39 as well as "substantially expelled or
extracted from its mother."' 140 By clarifying these key terms, the
Virginia legislature made a conscious effort to avoid the significant

137. VA. CODEANN. § 18.2-71.1(B) (2003).
138. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-74.2 (1997) (repealed 1999).
139. VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-71.1(C) (2003).
For the purposes of this section, 'human infant who has been born alive'
means a product of human conception that has been completely or
substantially expelled or extracted from its mother, regardless of the
duration of pregnancy, which after such expulsion or extraction breathes
or shows any other evidence of life such as beating of the heart, pulsation
of the umbilical cord, or definite movement of voluntary muscles, whether
or not the umbilical cord has been cut or the placenta is attached.
Id.
140. VA. CODEANN. §18.2-71.1(D) (2003).
For purposes of this section, 'substantially expelled or extracted from its
mother' means, in the case of a headfirst presentation, the infant's entire
head is outside the body of the mother, or, in the case of breech
presentation, any part of the infant's trunk past the navel is outside the
body of the mother.
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ambiguities present in the original version of the state partial-birth
abortion statute.
The district court, however, had found terms such as "from its
mother," "from the body of the mother," "outside the body of the
mother," and "involving dismemberment of the fetus prior to removal
from the body of the mother" unconstitutionally vague. But on appeal,
the dissenting judge reiterated that a statute is unconstitutionally vague
if it "fails to provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people
to understand what conduct it prohibits."' 14 1 Applying that standard,
the dissenting judge found it hard to imagine that any person of normal
intelligence would not be able to understand what these words
mean. 142 Thus, Virginia's revision at least appeared to clarify the
statute to the point that it was no longer constitutionally ambiguous.
The legislature also attempted to address the claim that it
presented an undue burden by including the D&E procedure in the
ban. By including specific references to protected forms of abortion,
including the D&E procedure, the revised Virginia statute arguably
escapes the problem of creating an undue burden. Similar to what
143
Judge Ryan found in Women's Medical ProfessionalCorp. v. Taft,
the Virginia statute is not overbroad because it specifically excludes
the D&E procedure from the statute, and the D&E procedure is the
only one similar enough to the banned form of abortion to potentially
create an undue burden. Unfortunately, the court never addressed this
issue because of the significance of the lack of a health exception.

IV. THE FEDERAL PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION BAN
As the above legal battles were being waged in the nation's
courts, a similar series of battles were taking place in the U.S.
Congress, as pro-life forces struggled to pass a ban on partial-birth
abortions. After President Clinton's vetoes of the partial-birth abortion
bans passed by the 104th and 105th Congresses, each subsequent
Congress has at least considered a similar bill.
In the 106th Congress, the Senate passed the Partial-Birth
141. Richmond Med. Ctr. for Women v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 642 (4th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 56 (1999)).
142. Id. The court further pointed out that even the plaintiffs own medical witness had
no trouble answering questions about the application of the statute. Had it been ambiguous,
the doctor would have asked for clarification rather than simply answering questions about the
statute. Id.
143. 353 F.3d 436, 446 (6th Cir. 2003).
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Abortion Ban Act of 1999, S. 1692, by a vote of 63-34.144 A very
similar piece of legislation, the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act of
2000, H.R. 3660, was approved by the House a short time later by a
vote of 287-14.145 When S. 1692 came under consideration by the
House, it was passed without objection after its language had been
modified to read identically to that of H.R. 3660.146 However, after
conferees had been appointed, formal action on the matter ceased, and
the bill's course hit a dead end. 1 47 The issue arose again in the 107th
Congress when the House passed the Partial-Birth Abortion Ban Act
of 2002 by a vote of 274-151.148 The bill was not, however,
considered by the Senate, and suffered a fate similar to that of its direct
predecessor.49
These two prospective measures were very similar in nature.
Each used a definition of "partial-birth abortion" based on the concept
of partially delivering a living fetus for the purpose of ending its life,
then intentionally engaging in a course of action that leads to this
result. 150
Also, both pieces of legislation outlined similar
repercussions for violations of the ban: the levying of fines and the
sentencing of prison terms of up to two years in duration. 51
Furthermore, both bills contained structural similarities that placed
them into a category with those vetoed by President Clinton. For
example, while providing an exception for cases where the mother's
life was determined to be contingent upon the performance of a
partial-birth abortion, each neglected to include an exception for cases
1 52
where merely the protection of the mother's health was at stake.
Supporters of the measures claimed these omissions to be non-issues,
based on the position, commonly espoused by opponents of partialbirth abortion, that such procedures are never necessary to protect
maternal health and, in fact, pose serious risks.' 5 3 However, the Court
144. See Congressional Research Service Report RL30415, Partial-Birth Abortion:
Recent Developments in the Law at 6, available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall

/crsreports/crsdocuments/RL30415b.pdf.
145. See id. at 7.
146. See id.
147. See id. at 6-7.
148. See id. at 7.
149. See id.
150. See Congressional Research Service Report RL30415, Partial-Birth Abortion:
Recent Developments in the Law at 7, available at http://www.law.umaryland.edu/marshall/

crsreports/crsdocuments/RL30415b.pdf.
151. See id.
152.

Seeid.

153. There is dissent in the medical community about the advantages of D&X
procedures. For example, see Jeffery Rosen, TRB from Washington; Legal battle over partial-
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has held that such a provision must be included in any regulation of
this practice, and opponents of the ban propose their own evidence that
partial-birth abortions are medically advantageous in some
situations. 154
During the 108th Congress, a ban on partial-birth abortion was
finally enacted into law.155 The measurepassed in the House by a vote
of 281-142 and by 64-34 in the Senate, 156 and was signed into law by
President George W. Bush on November 5, 2003.157 The Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act of 2003 was very similar to the two bills preceding
it, using a coinciding definition of the procedure in question and
providing for the same penalties to be inflicted upon violators of the
legislation. 158 Moreover, this measure, like the two before it, provided
an exception for cases where the life of the mother
was at issue, but
159
failed to do so for situations of endangered health.
Paralleling the perspectives on the previous ban attempts,
supporters of the measure claimed that a health exception was
unnecessary because of the lack of necessity associated with partialbirth abortions and the potential risks they pose. Opposition groups,
on the other hand, offered their own medical evidence as to the
necessity of the procedure under certain circumstances. Based on this
and other points of contention,160 a firestorm of controversy
birth abortions, New Rep., Nov. 29, 1999, at 6. Referring to the decision in Casey, Rosen
outlines how one judge "deferred to a Wisconsin judge who concluded, based on the
testimony of one Dr. Giles, that the D&X procedure is never medically necessary to preserve a
woman's health." Id.
154. See Carol Cruzan Morton, Doctors Wary of Partial-BirthAbortion Law, Boston
Globe, Oct. 28, 2003, at C3.
The bill . . . describes the D&X procedure as risky and medically
unjustified--claims most doctors dispute. A D&X, according to the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, "may be the best or

most appropriate procedure in a particular circumstance to save the life or
preserve the health of a woman, and only the doctor, in consultation with
the patient, based upon the woman's particular circumstances, can make
this decision."
Id. (citation omitted).
155. See supra note 144 at 7.
156. Id.
157. Id.

158.

See id.

159. See supra note 144 at 7.
160. See Gloria Feldt, The War on Choice: The Right-Wing Attack on Women's Rights
and How to Fight Back (Bantam Books 2004). Feldt argues that partial-birth abortion bans are
just the first step down the road towards totally outlawing abortion. Further, she sees the war
against abortion in all forms as a backlash against the steps made by American women toward
equality and freedom, as the ability to separate sex and childbearing is an essential step in

creating equality between the sexes. See also Steven Sawicki, And Baby Makes... Too Many?
9 E MAGAZINE: THE ENVIRONMENTAL MAGAZINE 28 (1998).

Sawicki offers evidence of the
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surrounding this Act exploded directly following its signing by
President Bush. Within two days, its enforcement had been prevented
by court decisions in California, New York, and Nebraska. 16 1 In the
subsequent months, a number of lawsuits have been decided with the
conclusion that the Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003 is, in fact,
unconstitutional. 162 The Nebraska ruling was affirmed by the Eighth
Circuit Court of Appeals in 2005,163 and is now headed to the Supreme
Court, with oral arguments likely to begin in 2006.164 Part V will
explain why the Court should finally put the nails in the coffin of this
ill-conceived piece of federal legislation.

V. THE INHERENT FLAWS OF THE PARTIAL-BIRTH ABORTION STATUTE

As noted previously, Congress had every opportunity to draft a
constitutional ban on certain types of partial-birth abortions. Had it
carefully studied the Court's ruling in Sternberg v. Carhart, where
the Court struck down a virtually identical state partial-birth abortion
law, 166 Congress could have avoided duplicating the mistakes made by
the Nebraska state legislature. It appears that the drafters of the
federal statute ignored the clear message from the Court, as well as
other lower federal courts, that subsequent to viability, any prohibition
on abortion must include an exception "where it is necessary, in
appropriate medical judgment, for the preservation of the life or health
of the mother." 167 Instead of respecting this long-standing mandate of
the Court, Congress chose to hold hearings about the procedure and
include congressional findings in the statute.1 68 These findings were
contrary to what numerous courts had found regarding the need for the
partial-birth abortion procedure in some cases to protect the health of
the mother. Specifically, the PBABA findings state that partial-birth
impending population crisis and argues that regulations detrimental to family planning
techniques, including limitations on the right to abortion, directly feed into this problem.
161. See Abortion Ban Blocked Again, WASH. POST, Nov. 7, 2003, at A2.
162. See supra note 144 at 8.
163. Carhart v. Gonzales, 413 F.3d 791 (8th Cir. 2005), cert. granted, 126 S. Ct. 1314
(U.S. Feb. 21, 2006) (No. 05-380).
164. Bob Egelko, Justice Dept. Seeks to Have Abortion Ban Reinstated; Three Federal
Judges have Already Ruled ProhibitionUnconstitutional,S.F. CHRON., Oct. 21, 2005, at A3.
165. 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
166. See supra notes 58-68 and accompanying text, for a more detailed discussion of this

case.
167. 530 U.S. 914, 930 (quoting 505 U.S. at 879, which quotes Roe, 410 U.S. at 164-65).
168. See Partial-Birth Abortion Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-105, § 2(1)-(2), 117 Stat.
1201 (2003).
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abortion is "a gruesome and inhumane procedure that is never
medically necessary and should be prohibited." 16 9 They further state
that Congress need not accept the Court's findings regarding the health
exception because the congressional findings determine that the health
exception is not necessary in this situation and the Court should give
these congressional findings great deference. 17 Congress included
these findings in the PBABA despite the testimony in their own record
that these conclusions1 7 were contrary to the positions of the major

medical organizations. 1
In the first appellate ruling striking down the PBABA, Carhart
v. Gonzolas,172 the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the
government's reliance on the congressional findings that a partial-birth
abortion is almost never medically necessary. The court agreed with a
recent Fourth Circuit case that "Stenberg established the health
exception requirement as a per se constitutional rule. ' 173 The Eighth
Circuit continued, "this rule is based on substantial medical authority
(from a broad array of sources) recognized by the Supreme Court, and
this body of medical authority does not have to be reproduced in every
subsequent challenge to a 'partial-birth statute' lacking a health
exception." 174 This unanimous Eighth Circuit decision also stated that
the appropriate question is whether "substantial medical authority"
supports the medical necessity of the banned procedure, and that when
there is no clear consensus in the medical community, "the
Constitution requires legislatures to err on the side of protecting

169. Id.
170. Id.
However, under well-settled Supreme Court jurisprudence, the United
States Congress is not bound to accept the same factual findings that the
Supreme Court was bound to accept in Stenberg under the 'clearly
erroneous' standard. Rather, the United States Congress is entitled to
reach its own factual findings-findings that the Supreme Court accords
great deference-and to enact legislation based upon these findings so
long as it seeks to pursue a legitimate interest that is within the scope of
the Constitution, and draws reasonable inferences based upon substantial
evidence.
Id. at § 2(3)-(13).
171. See, e.g., 149 Cong. Rec. S11454-01, 11456 (Daily ed. Sept. 15, 2003) (Letter from
Am. Pub. Health Ass'n, to the House of Representatives (Mar. 31, 2003)) (referring to partialbirth abortions as "medically accepted" procedures).
172. 413 F.3d 791 (2005). This case was initially filed under the name Carhart v.
Ashcroft.
173. Id. at 796 (citing Richmond Med. Ctr. v. Hicks, 409 F.3d 619, 625-26 (2005)). This
Fourth Circuit decision struck down a Virginia statute that was very similar to the federal
PBABA.
174. Carhart,413 F.3d at 796.
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women's health by including a health exception." 175 As the court
noted, even one of the government's own witnesses testified that there
was a "body of medical opinion," including positions taken by the
American College of Obstetrics and Gynecologists, that the procedures
176
prohibited by the PBABA may sometimes be medically necessary.
As the Eighth Circuit concluded, the Court has already clearly spoken
on this matter. The PBABA must be struck down simply because it
does not provide an exception for the mother's health. 17 7 Support for
strength of this precedent and the necessity of striking down the law
comes from the treatment of the absence of a medical exception in
similar state laws. As noted above, courts have struck down twelve
state laws for the lack of a health exception. 178 Further support comes
from the district court holdings with respect to the PBABA itself.
In Carhartv. Ashcroft,179 the district court case from which this
Eighth Circuit Appeal was taken, one of the grounds on which the
lower court found the PBABA unconstitutional was the lack of a
Likewise, the district court in Planned
health exception.
Parenthood Federation of America v. Ashcroft, found that Stenberg
required a health exception. 18 Although the court noted that it did not
need to address this issue in light of its previous findings, it decided to
address the issue anyway in light of all the effort the parties put into
arguing the case. 182 After an extensive review of the evidence
presented by both parties, as well as the evidence on which Congress
made its findings, the court ruled that, in applying Stenberg, it really
had no option but to find that the lack of an exception for the mother's
health rendered the statute unconstitutional. 183 As to the extent of
deference that should be given to congressional findings, the court
stated that, "Congress has not drawn reasonable inferences based on
substantial evidence, and its findings are therefore not entitled to

175. Id.
176. Id. at 803 (citing Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1009 (2005)).
177. Of course, while it seems clear that if the make up of the Court were the same as it
was when Stenberg was decided, the law would be upheld, the replacement of O'Connor does
create some uncertainty. As both proponents and opponents of the law concede, the outcome
of this case may hinge on the extent to which the newest justices feel compelled to follow
precedent. See Robin Toner & Adam Liptak, Court in Transition: Abortion; In New Court
Roe May Stand, So Foes Look to Limit Its Scope, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 2005, at 1.
178. See supra Part III.A.4.

179. 331 F. Supp. 2d 805 (D. Neb. 2004).
180.

Id.

181. 320 F. Supp. 2d 957 (D. Cal. 2004).
182. Id.
183.

Id.
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84

substantial deference."'
Finally, while the third district court to consider the PBABA,
National Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, 185 has not yet made a
definitive ruling on the constitutionality of the PBABA, it did issue a
temporary restraining order prohibiting enforcement of the Act,
finding that it was substantially likely that the plaintiffs would be able
to succeed on the merits of the case. In that case, the plaintiffs had
argued that, among other issues, the statute was unconstitutional
because86 it did not contain an exception to protect the woman's
health. 1
Thus, a review of both the state court holdings regarding
similar state statutes and the federal cases at the district and circuit
court levels considering the constitutionality of the PBABA make it
clear that the absence of an exception for the woman's health alone is
sufficient to render this statute unconstitutional. But the statute is also
vulnerable to challenge on other grounds.
Because the lack of the mother's health exception was
sufficient to uphold the lower court's decision to strike down the
PBABA,
the Eighth
Circuit did not address any other potential defects
187
In
in the statute.
It is highly likely that the Court will likewise resolve
the case simply by applying the precedent from Stenberg with respect
to the lack of a health exception. 188 However, in the interests of
providing a thorough evaluation of the statute, this article will also
address another potential flaw in the PBABA: that it places an undue
burden on women.
184. Id. at 1014.
185. 330 F. Supp. 2d. 436 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
186. But see Nat'l. Abortion Federation v. Ashcroft, a subsequent ruling in the case
where the district court refused to grant the plaintiffs motion for summary judgment on the
grounds that the failure to include an exception for the mother's health made the PBABA
unconstitutional as a matter of law. Unlike other courts that had said the absence of the
exception made the statute unconstitutional as a matter of law, this district court believed that
the constitutionality of the Act had to be judged according to Stenberg's requirement that
abortion regulations had to include a maternal health exception if a significant body of medical
opinion believed a procedure brought with it greater safety advantages, and in light of the
congressional findings that there was no evidence that the procedure never offered such safety
advantages, a question of fact had been created. Id.
187. "Because the Act does not contain a health exception, it is unconstitutional. We
therefore do not reach the district court's conclusion of the Act imposing an undue burden on a
woman's right to have an abortion." Carhart,413 F.3d at 803-04.
188. As one editorialist noted, the opinion was a model of clarity and restraint, with the
author of the opinion sticking very close to the precedent of Stenberg. See Real Judicial
Restraint,ST. LOUIS POST-DISPATCH, July 12, 2005, at B6. This approach should make it easy

for the Court to affirm the appellate court's ruling on the grounds that it is simply following
the well-established precedent.
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The question of whether the PBABA places an undue burden
on a woman's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy has
been addressed by the district courts in both Carhart v. Ashcroft and
PlannedParenthoodFederationof America v. Ashcroft. 189 Likewise,
as the cases discussed in Part III.A.3190 reveal, the primary reason for
striking down many state partial-birth abortion bans has been that they
place an undue burden on the woman's right to decide whether to
terminate her pregnancy.
As Part 11I.A.3 explains, courts have found that a number of
these laws create an undue burden on a woman's Fourteenth
Amendment rights in a variety of ways. Some laws have been found
to be overly broad when they prohibit physicians from being able to
perform otherwise safe and constitutional procedures. Others fail to
distinguish between pre- and post-viability procedures, or are so
ambiguously worded as to make a physician reluctant to use certain
preferable procedures because of a fear that they will violate the
statute. 191
Most of the courts striking down these laws, as well as the
three district courts that have enjoined the PBABA, have looked to the
Court's decision in Stenberg for guidance in determining what
constitutes an undue burden. In Stenberg, the Court said that a law
creates an undue burden when it "has the purpose or effect of placing a
substantial obstacle in the path of a woman seeking an abortion of a
nonviable fetus.' 192 The Court found the statute at issue in that case
placed an undue burden on a woman's right to choose because the
statute required the delivery into the vagina of "a living unborn child,
or substantial portion thereof," 193 and the Court did not see how that
language distinguished the prohibited intact D&E from the lawful
D&E procedure. 194 Thus, it placed an undue burden on the woman's
right to choose because the physician may believe that he cannot risk
undertaking the procedure that would be best for the mother because it
95
might be deemed to fall under the Act's prohibition.'
The government, however, believed that the more specific
language in the PBABA saved it from the constitutional problem of
189. See supra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
190. See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
191. Id.
192. See Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914, 921 (2000) (quoting Planned Parenthood of
Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992)).
193. NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-326(9) (2004).
194. See Stenberg, 530 U.S. at 921.
195. Id.
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the Nebraska statute. 196 In Planned Parenthood Federation of
America v. Ashcroft, the government argued that the language
distinguishes intact D&Es from other procedures because the specific
act to kill the fetus must happen at a particular point and place in time.
According to the government, "the fact that during the course of a
D&E or induction, some 'overt act' is taken to kill a living fetus ...
does not render D&E or induction unlawful" because the1 97
overt act
characteristic of each of the other procedures does not occur.
The district court, however, did not agree with this argument.
According to the testimony at the trial:
In any D&E or induction, if the fetus has been brought
to the point "where any part of the fetal trunk past the
navel is outside the body of the mother" or "the entire
fetal head is outside the body of the mother," a
physician may then, in order to complete the abortion in
the safest manner, need to perform an "overt act," short
of completing delivery, that the physician knows the
fetus cannot
survive, if it is still living, and that "kills"
19 8
fetus.
the
In light of the medical testimony presented to it, the court concluded
that any abortion performed using the D&E or induction method could
violate the Act when the physician was trying to perform it in the
safest manner. 199 Thus, a physician would often have to worry that he
might, to best serve his patient, violate the PBABA. 20 0 Also, the
government claimed that the statute precluded only the intact D&E
procedure, but the court was concerned that Congress did not simply
state this in the statute.201 In fact, arguably Congress purposefully
ignored Stenberg, as there was evidence in the congressional record
that some opponents had pointed out the over-breadth problem when
196. The government argued that the PBABA differed from the Nebraska statute in
Stenberg in three respects: (1) the Act requires delivery of the fetus outside of the mother; (2)
the Act specifies the required protruding fetal parts; and (3) the Act proscribes an overt act
distinct from the completion of the delivery itself, and consequently, the law will not prohibit
many of the lawful procedures prohibited by the Nebraska law, and therefore it does not pose
an undue burden on a woman's right to choose. Planned Parenthood,320 F. Supp. 2d 957,
970 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
197. Id. at971.
198. Id. at 972-73 (citations omitted).
199. See id.
200. Id. at 974.
201. Id.
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In light of these facts, the court
the law was being considered.
found that the PBABA suffered from similar flaws as the statute in
Stenberg, and imposed an undue burden on a woman's right to
choose.
In Carhartv. Ashcroft, the district court also found the PBABA
to be unconstitutional because in limiting physicians' abilities to
choose the safest and best procedures for their patients, the law placed
an undue burden on the woman. 204 There was significant evidence in
the record that in some cases, the best choice of medical procedures
would be a method that was banned by the law. That method might be
safer, more convenient, or less painful, and to prohibit the physician
from exercising his best medical judgment in these situations placed an
undue burden on the woman's right. While the appellate court did not
need to address this second constitutional problem, if it had, it would
have most likely found, consistent with the Court's holding in Planned
Parenthood, that the law does indeed impose an undue burden on
women. Such a holding is consistent with the undue burden cases
involving state laws discussed above in Part III.A.3.

VI. CONCLUSION

Based on the foregoing, it is clear that the federal Partial-Birth
Abortion Ban Act is unconstitutional. The district courts and the
single circuit court of appeals that have examined the statute have
done a very thorough and fair job of analyzing the evidence in this
case, and have come to the only conclusion that can be justified under
Stenberg: that the PBABA is unconstitutional because it fails to
include an exception for the mother's health. It is also highly likely
that the statute is unconstitutional because it places an undue burden
202. Id. at 975.
203. Id. The statute was also found to be unconstitutional because it failed to distinguish
between pre-viability and post-viability in violation of Roe. Id. That same court also found
the statute to be unconstitutionally vague. It noted that the term "partial-birth abortion" has no
medical meaning, and several of the terms in the Act are ambiguous, making it unclear exactly
which procedures would be banned under the Act. Therefore, the statute is unconstitutionally
vague. Id. at 976-78. Illustrative of the vagueness of the Act cited by the Court is the term
"living human fetus," which says nothing about viability, which is required by Casey and Roe.
Id. at 977. Thus, the district court most clearly demonstrated the flawed construction of the
PBABA.
204. Carhart v. Ashcroft, 331 F. Supp. 2d 805, 1030 (D. Neb. 2004) (because the ban
reaches the D&E abortion method used by physicians like Dr. Carhart, the law is an undue
burden and unconstitutional.).
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on the mother's right to choose.
Instead of attempting to use creative "findings" to pass
legislation, if Congress wishes to ban a very specific type of postviability abortion, it should examine the courts' rulings in challenges
to both state and federal partial-birth abortion statutes and revise the
law in accordance with these opinions. At a minimum, statutes need to
add an exception for the mother's health. Secondly, statutes must
include a medical definition of the procedure that the legislature wants
to prohibit. 20 5 Such a definition will ensure that the law is not seen as
unconstitutionally vague for not letting doctors know which
procedures are banned and being subject to interpretation in such a
way that it would ban lawful procedures. 206 The law also needs to
specify that the ban applies to only post-viability procedures so as to
once more prevent it from being viewed as overly broad and therefore
placing an undue burden on women. By following this course of
action, a constitutional, limited
ban on certain types of partial-birth
20 7
possible.
be
may
abortions

205. All drafters would need to do is look to the Ohio Partial-birth Abortion Statute as a
model, specifically, OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.15 l(A)(3) (2000).
206. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.151(F) (2000) provides a model for how to avoid this
problem: simply list the procedures that are not prohibited. If the drafters are indeed interested
in banning a specific procedure, and are not trying to undermine the basic holding of Roe, then
they would include such a provision.
207. The caution of this prediction is based on a potential problem that the Court has yet
to address, i.e., whether Congress really has the authority to limit abortion procedures in the
first place. As Professor Allan Ides pointed out in The Partial-BirthAbortion Ban Act of 2003
and the Commerce Clause, 20 Const. Com. 441 (2004), this statute is justified as an exercise
of power under the Commerce Clause, but in light of the increasingly more stringent definition
of "affecting interstate commerce" being used by the Court since United States v. Lopez, 514
U.S. 549 (1995), it is difficult to see how regulating types of abortions constitutes a regulation
of interstate commerce. It appears, at least on the surface, to be a regulation of a noneconomic matter that is not a part of a larger regulation of some economic matter, and
therefore should not be subject to congressional regulation.

